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Comparative Employment Relations: Institutional and Neo-Institutional Theories

Comparative employment relations (CER) has enjoyed a resurgence of interest and scholarly
research in recent years. A significant reason is the rising tide of globalization and its present and
future impact on employment relations institutions and practices. Rather quickly the furthest
corners of the Earth have become interconnected in an international division of labor and system
of market exchange, inevitably raising questions about the nature and extent of change in
national employment relations systems and the degree to which they are converging to a similar
model.
As all participants know, CER is an incredibly large and complex undertaking because
of the huge diversity in employment relations systems (ERSs) across nations and the large
complications introduced by differences in languages, cultures, institutions, and legal systems.
This has made theorizing in CER particularly difficult and challenging. Illustratively,
international/comparative textbooks typically have at best a modest discussion of theory and for
the most part consist of a chapter by chapter descriptive review of major labor institutions and
laws across countries (e.g., Bean, 1994; Van Ruysseveldt, Huiskamp and van Hoof, 1995;
Bamber, Lansbury, Wailes, 2004). Also indicative of the under-developed and challenged nature
of CER theory are these comments by well-recognized people. Jack Barbash begins the volume
Theories and Concepts in Comparative Industrial Relations (1989: 3) with the statement, “If we
are not bound by one theory it is just possible that common values inform our work,” while in
the mid-1990s Richard Locke, Thomas Kochan, and Michael Piore (1995: xv-xvi, emphasis
added) assert, “The last major attempt to develop a comprehensive framework for thinking about
national differences in industrial relations was the Ford Foundation’s interuniversity study, a
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project initiated in the late 1950s.” Still more recently, Richard Hyman (2004) asserts that not
only in the early 21st century does the ER field still lack a common theoretical corpus but
attempts to develop one for cross-national comparative work are “neither possible nor desirable”
(p. 267) because cultural and institutional diversities are so large they effectively preclude useful
and reliable generalization.
Part of the scholarly mission is to advance scientific knowledge and nothing is more
essential to this task than theory. One must ask, therefore, whether things on the theory front in
CER are really as dark as these quotations suggest? As this review demonstrates, the answer is
No and, indeed, a steady stream of theoretical models and insights have appeared in the CER
field over a several decade period. On the other hand, this review also affirms that theorizing in
CER is in indeed a challenging exercise and certainly to this date no consensus theory or
paradigm has emerged. Rather, what we have are diverse frameworks, theories and models that
highlight key actors, institutions and forces that shape ERSs at a point in time and cause them to
change over time. These frameworks, theories and models have come from several different
disciplines and schools of thought, including radical/Marxist sociology, neoclassical economics,
and international human resource management (HRM).
Situated more or less in the middle of this literature and occupying the largest space are
theories and models that are broadly known as “institutional” and “neo-institutional” (INI). The
institutional perspective in CER was large in the immediate post-World War II period, went into
eclipse in the 1970s-1980s, and has rebounded as neo-institutionalism (or “new institutionalism”)
during the last twenty years. The center of gravity was originally in economics and the USA,
since the early 1990s it has shifted to Europe and sociology and political science.
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The INI literature on comparative employment relations, because it crosses disparate
disciplines and different countries, has to date existed in a rather fragmented and non-integrated
state. To help remedy this situation, and also to provide easier access to this field of study for
people coming to it for the first time, I undertake in this chapter a review and synthesis of the
institutional-oriented literature on CER. Other useful if somewhat differently focused reviews are
provided by Strauss, (1998), Godard (2004), Martin and Bamber (2004), Hamann and Kelly
(2008), and Hall and Wailes (2010). The review here is limited to issues of theory and to the
English language portion of the field.

Definition, Boundary and Specification Issues in CER
The first issue a person faces in exploring comparative employment relations is the question:
what is CER? This question is worth asking because there is evident diversity of opinion on this
matter and it introduces a similar diversity into CER theorizing and dialogue (Strauss, 1998).
Other chapters in this volume, and particularly the introductory chapter by the volume
editors, consider in some depth the domain and major subject areas in CER so I only broach
certain key issues here as they bear on theorizing. These issues fall into five categories.
The first is the subject area that CER covers and that a theory therefore needs to explain.
One sees in the literature both a broad and narrow conception of CER’s subject territory (Crouch,
1993; Budd, 2004: Kaufman, 2008). The narrow conception focuses on collective aspects of
employment relationships and, in particular, differences across countries in union density, union
structure, collective bargaining practices and outcomes, and union-related labor laws and
institutions. The second and broader conception focuses on employment relationships of all
types and, in particular, variation across countries in employment institutions and outcomes such
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as the occupational and industrial distribution of employment, wage structures and inequalities,
extent of female employment and child labor, degree of state regulation of employment
conditions, and the various union-related topics already mentioned.
A second issue concerns the difference between comparative ER and international ER.
Sometimes the terms are used more or less interchangeably; experts in the field (e.g., Poole,
1986; Bamber, Lansbury, and Wailes, 2004), however, often treat them as separate if
substantially overlapping. The domain of international ER is the study of employment systems in
different countries, with an emphasis on description and case-by-case analysis (e.g., Blum, 1981;
Doeringer, 1981; Ferner and Hyman, 1992). Comparative ER, on the other hand, involves an
explicit comparison of ER systems across two or more countries with the intent to identify
common patterns and theoretical generalizations.
A third issue is the nature of the dependent variable in CER theorizing. A review of the
literature reveals studies have used three different specifications. The first dependent variable is a
measure of the institutional architecture of an employment relations system, such as the degree
of centralization in wage determination. A second dependent variable is an employment relations
behavior or outcome, such as cross-national variation in union density or income inequality. A
third dependent variable measures some aspect of employment relations performance, such as
national GDP or employment growth.
A fourth issue concerns the level of analysis in CER theorizing. Differences in
employment relations architectures, outcomes and performance can be examined at a firm,
industry, regional, national, or international level. Most CER studies use the national level and
look at variation in employment relations institutions and outcomes across nation states.
However, many nations exhibit distinct variation in employment relations across firms,
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industries and regions (e.g., services versus manufacturing; northern versus southern Italy) and
quite possibly this within-country variation is as interesting and revealing as the across-country
variation (Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Crouch, 2005). Methodologically, one can also argue that a
macro theory of cross-national differences in employment relations needs to be built on a
consistent micro version developed at the firm level.
A fifth issue concerns the range of countries included in CER theorizing. Conceptually
one would think all countries are included; for theoretical, practical and ethnocentric reasons,
however, most researchers limit the list and exclude or greatly minimize countries classified as
less developed (LDCs), micro states, or socialist (e.g., Zimbabwe; Luxembourg, Cuba).
Regarding LDCs, a theoretical reason is that a large portion of jobs in LDCs are either in
agriculture or the informal sector and thus these countries have neither the labor movements nor
conventional employment relationships that are the traditional objects of analysis in CER;
similarly, in socialist countries the EIR systems may well be non-comparable with those in
capitalist countries. A practical reason is that data on employment structures and outcomes are
often not available or the sample size is too small for LDCs, micro states and socialist countries.
Also entering the picture is ethnocentrism as one finds that most writers come from a small
number of advanced western countries and their attention tends to focus on these countries, with
the USA, Britain and Germany leading the list.

Setting the Stage: Employment Relations Theory
As now viewed by the majority of researchers, the field of Employment Relations (ER) deals
with the subjects of work; the structure, management and regulation of the employment
relationship; and the quality of work life (Edwards, 2003; Kaufman, 2004a). This field was until
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recently called Industrial Relations (IR) and, indeed, the two names co-exist and are used more
or less interchangeably.
The ER/IR field (hereafter EIR) typically looks at employment relations in the context of
a particular country and thus the nation state becomes the standard unit of analysis. Further, the
most common theoretical approach in EIR is to look at a nation’s employment relations as a
system (described more below). Thus, it is common to talk about the American EIR system, the
French EIR system, and so on.
The task undertaken by CER is to broaden the focus of analysis from the individual
nation state to a cross-country comparison of EIR systems. In particular, a principle goal of CER
is to understand and explain the differential structure, function and performance of alternative
EIR systems. To the degree possible, one would like a theory, model or at least conceptual
framework to help guide and illuminate this investigation. But where should one look?
Perhaps the most obvious answer is to search among existing EIR theories that pertain to
the individual nation state and then see if they can be broadened/expanded to explain crossnational variation. The subject of international economics, for example, is largely an application
of demand/supply theory developed for individual goods and countries to issues of global
finance and trade; in similar fashion one could well think that what is called for is not an entirely
new and novel theory of CER but, rather, an application of existing EIR models, theories and
frameworks to cross-country comparison.
A number of books and articles have been written on EIR theory so no comprehensive
review need be undertaken here (see Adams and Meltz, 1993; Edwards, 2003, Blyton and
Turnbull, 2004; Kaufman, 2004b; Müller-Jentsch, 2004). Certain salient points and important
studies deserve highlight, however.
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It must first be admitted that development of a formal theory of EIR has made only
modest and incomplete progress. The first self-claimed attempt to develop a “general theory” of
industrial relations is by John Dunlop in his book Industrial Relations Systems (1958). His model
will be reviewed below so I postpone detailed description of it. What merits comment here are
two aspects. The first is that the system idea is Dunlop’s most influential conceptual contribution
to EIR theory; the second is that in most people’s eyes Dunlop’s model is a useful conceptual
framework but is not a theory of employment relations per se – at least if the desideratum of a
theory is a testable hypothesis.
A second relevant point about EIR theory is that authors build their models around
different core features of the employment relationship. Flanders (1965), for example, theorizes
IR as a model of “job regulation;” Barbash’s (1984) model explains workplace conflict as the
collision of management’s drive for efficiency and low cost and employees’ desire for good pay,
conditions and security; Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986) select strategic choice as the key
variable explaining different EIR configurations; Begin (1991) derives alternative ERSs based on
different organizational architectures; Hills (1995) portrays ERSs as built around different
systems of workplace control; Marsden (1999) derives alternative ERSs as an outcome of EIR
practices that constrain opportunism and free-riding by employers and employees; Budd (2004)
makes the central focus of EIR the balanced attainment of efficiency, equity and voice; while
Kaufman (2010) argues that the core concept in EIR theory is the human nature of labor. Some
of these models are similar to Dunlop’s in that they largely serve as useful taxonomical guides
and frameworks; several, however, go further and yield testable hypotheses. A particular
hypothesis of importance concerns complementarity and, in particular, the idea that EIR
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components are not put together randomly or by “mix and match” but rather are consciously
chosen so they fit together as an integrated and synergistic whole.
Third, a large portion of recent theorizing on EIR systems is not taking place in the EIR
field itself but rather in contiguous fields such as economic sociology, political economy, and
strategic human resource management. North America was the locus of most EIR theorizing up
until the late 1980s, after that the EIR field (particularly in the USA) started on a long and
cumulatively substantial decline and interest in EIR theory went with it (with certain exceptions,
as given by citations above). Other fields picked up the EIR systems idea, albeit typically under
different names and labels, and continued to develop it. In strategic HRM, for example, authors
have developed different models of employment systems and “HRM architectures” (Lepak and
Snell, 1999; Toh, Morgeson, and Campion, 2008); likewise, researchers in the Marxist/radicaloriented labour process field have developed alternative EIR systems built around the concept of
“regimes of control” (Edwards, 1979). Of particular relevance to this chapter is the work on EIR
systems in economic sociology and political economy, particularly in Europe. Best known under
the rubric “varieties of capitalism” (VoC), this literature seeks to theorize the determinants of
economic structure, organization and performance within and across nation states. This theory
encompasses all dimensions of an economy but a central part in most studies is the EIR system.
Fourth, and finally, the dominant theoretical wellspring of EIR theories is what is loosely
called “institutionalism.” The field of industrial relations began as a formal entity in the United
States around 1920, was positioned as the labor subfield of the institutional approach to
economics; and was led by John Commons and other members of the Wisconsin School who
were proponents of the institutional approach (Kaufman, 1993, 2004a). Institutionalism in
America had strong links to both the discipline of sociology and European-style historical/social
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economics. In America later generations of industrial relationists followed in the institutional and
neo-institutional tradition, exemplified by Dunlop, Kochan, Budd and others. The field of EIR
was slow to develop in continental Europe and still today has only a modest organized presence
(Kaufman, 2004a); hence, this lacuna is mostly filled by sociology and, in particular, economic
sociology (aka, socio-economics). One of the fathers of sociology, Emile Durkheim (1895),
identified the subject matter of the discipline as the “study of institutions” and, not surprisingly,
institutionalism is a particularly strong theoretical tradition in VoC and similar EIR-related work
among European sociologists, political scientists, and business theorists.

Institutionalism: A Brief Survey
Institutionalism has diverse roots going back a century and more (Hodgson, 1998;
Hollingsworth, 2002; Kaufman, 2004a). Its original source was late 19th century German
historical/social economics (HSE). HSE was a reaction against two other economic doctrines.
One is the English classical and neoclassical economics that largely models economies as a
mechanical working-out of commodity exchanges among a mass of unconnected individuals in a
highly competitive market place where government, culture, social groups, and legal institutions
have little or no role to play. The chief architect of this type of “non-institutional” economics is
Leon Walras and his style of general equilibrium economics ruled orthodox economics for much
of the 20th century. The second economic doctrine that spurred the development of HSE was
Marxist economics and, in particular, Marx’s brand of economic determinism that forecast the
replacement of capitalism and representative government with socialism and a dictatorship of the
proletariat.

10

From a neoclassical perspective, differences in employment relations institutions across
countries arise from either competitive market forces or the interference of government and other
collective actors -- a view first enunciated by Adam Smith (1776/1937). To the degree it is the
former, institutions are created by economic agents to facilitate production and exchange and
exist as long as they serve this objective. From this functional perspective, institutions do not
have independent explanatory power but are creatures of market forces and neutrally transmit
these forces. To the degree institutions arise from the interference of government and other
collective actors, they serve mostly as agents of redistribution and rent-seeking and, in all but
exceptional cases of market failure, interfere with the efficient functioning of the economy. A
prominent line of thought in neoclassical economics, and also among “universalistic” theorists in
strategic human resource management (Boxall and Purcell, 2008), holds that over the long run
globalization, market forces, and profit-seeking will erode and eliminate non-competitive
institutions and, hence, economies should converge to some form of competitive market system
along neo-liberal lines with a universalistic set of “best practice” HRM methods.
The neoclassical perspective has two large implications for the field of CER. The first is
to largely dismiss it as an interesting line of inquiry on the grounds that EIR institutions are
substantively unimportant, mostly anti-market, and/or transitory from a long-run perspective.
The second is to suggest that if one wants to explain cross-national differences in EIR
institutions then the place to start is cross-national levels of economic development -- given the
presumption that the configuration of EIR institutions functionally serves economic efficiency
and that different configurations are therefore called for at different stages of economic
development. The implication is that one should look to neoclassical growth theory to explain
cross-national variation in development level and, as illustrated by modern treatises on this
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subject (e.g., Acemoglu, 2009), institutions play a distinctly secondary role and most of the
action comes from differences in economic variables such as capital investment, labor force
growth, human capital accumulation and technological change.
On the opposite end of the spectrum is Marxist economics. Where neoclassical
economics suggests that a market economy leads to harmony, efficiency, growth and a
reasonably equitable income distribution, Marxism predicts just the opposite. Capitalism
survives and reproduces by exploiting labor to obtain surplus value that is then funneled into
further capital investment. Expanded capital investment, however, leads to a falling rate of profit
and concentration of industry (i.e., growing monopoly) – both of which lead to a decline in the
economy’s growth rate and eventual emergence of stagnation. To prop-up profits, employers
seek to expand markets through imperialism, colonialism and foreign wars while at the same
time they work to reduce production cost by further squeezing labor through speed-ups, longer
hours, and hiring of women and child labor. Thus, control and exploitation become the
imperatives for employers under capitalism while protection and resistance are the mirror image
imperatives for workers (Hyman, 1975; Thompson and Hartley, 2007). Over time class conflict,
strikes, and socio-economic polarization grow until a proletarian revolution replaces capitalism
with socialism and a workers’ state.
Marxism also has implications for the study of CER. Like neoclassical economics, it also
predicts a convergence over time in the nature/shape of national economies and, hence, in EIR
institutions and practices. Also like neoclassical economics, it downplays the independent role
that institutions play in economic growth. That is, while in neoclassical economics institutions
are largely a “veil” for market forces, in Marxism institutions are also largely a veil but in this
case for requirements of the production system. That is, in the Marxist schema the “forces of
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production” largely determine the “relations of production” (i.e., social, economic, political
institutions). In one respect, however, Marxism leads to the opposite conclusion of neoclassism
with regard to cross-national variation in EIR institutions. A neoclassical perspective predicts
that over time competitive market forces and globalization should gradually erode and eventually
eliminate trade unions and other non-competitive labor market institutions; a Marxist perspective
predicts, however, that trade unions, strikes and other institutions of worker protectionism should
increase as capitalists intensify their drive for surplus value in the face of mounting economic
stagnation and crises.
Institutionalism carves out a middle space between the neoclassical and Marxist
paradigms. It combines elements of both but at the same time amends certain key assumptions
and introduces new concepts. The end result is that in this paradigm institutions play a central
role in structuring and shaping national economies, their growth trajectories, and configuration of
EIR practices and outcomes (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1998; Budd, 2004; North, 2005).
The first key modification in the institutional paradigm is to move away from economic
determinism à la Walras and Marx. To do so, institutional theory starts with a more realistic
model of the human agent (Commons, 1934; Coase, 1992). People are modeled as purposive,
largely self-interested, and intelligent but nonetheless also endowed with significant cognitive
constraints, perceptual biases, powerful emotional states, and social orientations. The external
environment to the agent is also modified so domains of fundamental uncertainty exist in
economic life that cannot be reasonably captured in theory by an assumed probability
distribution.
The next key modification is to drop the neoclassical assumption that a stable society,
well-functioning government, well-enforced regime of contract law, and a competitive market
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system are somehow exogenously provided. Rather, in institutional theory the major challenge
facing every country is to create, structure and maintain an institutional order that provides these
things (Coase, 1992). That is, people have to collectively create a government, maintain law and
social order, decide the kind of economy they want and the objectives it should serve, and create
mechanisms that solve market failures and maintain social peace (Aoki, 2000; North, 2005).
The foundation of the institutional paradigm, therefore, is boundedly rational people who
must cooperate in constructing and maintaining an institutional order when they face substantial
uncertainty and come to the situation with selfish motives, partially non-rational and destructive
emotions, diverse and perhaps divisive cultural/religious/political allegiances, and asymmetric
information and objectives. To make progress in constructing an institutional order, these people
create organizations called governments vested with sovereign authority to maintain law and
order, create a legal code, enforce contracts and establish the infrastructure needed for a
functioning economy. These governments define the modern nation state and it is these nation
states that become the basic unit of analysis in institutional CER.
In the institutional paradigm there are few “universals” of human behavior, given that
human behavior is always embedded in and therefore shaped by diverse cultural, social and
historical contexts (Polanyi, 1944; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1998). Given this, the government
and all subsidiary institutions in a nation state are to a large degree context specific and develop
along path dependent historical trajectories (Deeg and Jackson, 2007). As in the neoclassical and
Marxist paradigms, CER systems across countries reflect stages of economic development;
unlike in these paradigm, however, the collectivities of people and ruling elites in each nation
determine through a constructed institutional order what kind of economy they have, how it
operates, whose interests and objectives it serves, and how problems and disputes are solved.
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The result is a huge diversity in societies, economies and CER systems, considerable persistence
and stability in CER institutions, and therefore outside of crisis situations mostly incremental
change and only weak-to-modest forces leading to convergence through either market
competition or universal requirements of production.
The core proposition of institutionalism is “institutions matter” in predicting an
economy’s architecture and performance. However, no one theory of institutionalism commands
universal agreement; indeed, Strycker (2002: 53) speaks of a “variety of institutionalisms.” What
can be said, however, is that institutionalism in economics, after a 30-40 year downturn
following World War II and the neoclassical resurgence, has reemerged since the early 1990s –
sometimes under the labels “neo-institutionalism” and “new institutionalism” – as a popular and
growing area of research. In the USA, economists such as Coase, North and Williamson are
prominent names in new institutionalism; in Europe a mix of sociologists, political economists
and political scientists have spearheaded the neo-institutional movement. Important names
include Amable, Boyer, Hall, Soskice, Streeck, and Thelen.

Anglo-American INI Theories
The CER theoretical literature can usefully be divided into two parts. The first is in employment
and industrial relations proper (the EIR field) and comes largely from authors in AngloAmerican countries. The second is largely centered in European sociology and gives emphasis to
theories such as varieties of capitalism. I focus on the Anglo-American set of INI theories in this
section and move to those from European sociology in the next.

Micro Theories of Employment Systems
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As discussed earlier, the central organizing concept in CER is the notion of an EIR system. As
also earlier discussed, on methodological grounds one can make a good argument that “macro”
theories of cross-national variation in CERs should be built on consistent “micro” theories as
developed for individual firms, industries and nations. Toward this end, I start here with a brief
review of several micro theories of employment relations systems and then move to macro
theories. Included in this micro section is discussion of Dunlop’s notion of an industrial relations
system.
ERS Models. John Commons, the academic co-founder of the IR field and American
branch of institutional economics, is also the originator of ERS typologies. In his book Industrial
Goodwill (1919) Commons identifies five alternative “theories of labor” – commodity
(demand/supply), machinery (scientific management), good will (commitment), public utility (a
publicly protected resource), and citizenship (industrial autocracy/democracy) – and discusses
how each theory leads to a different model of people management and associated practices.
Commons’ explanation of these systems is discursive but one finds sprinkled here and there
factors that he points to as determinative. The commodity model, for example, is a good fit for
low-skill jobs where the work is standardized and easily monitored; the good will model, on the
other hand, is good fit where jobs require higher level and more intangible-type skills and where
cooperation and good citizenship behavior have particular value.
For the next major ERS contributions in industrial relations we now fast forward to the
1950s. One comes from economist Clark Kerr and the other from John Dunlop.
Kerr (1950, 1954) first divides labor markets into “structured” and “unstructured.” The
latter is equivalent to Commons’ “commodity model” where undifferentiated labor is traded back
and forth, turnover is high, demand and supply determine wages and other terms and conditions
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of employment, and employer HRM practices are very bare-bones. The former correspond to
what Kerr calls “institutional” labor markets that are structured by various rules, norms, and
organizational features created by employers, unions and/or government. He divides structured
labor markets into two generic ERS types: “communal ownership” and “private property.” The
former is exemplified by an occupational labor market or industry organized by a craft union
where jobs require well-recognized skills but the skills are general and therefore portable (e.g., in
nursing, construction); the latter is exemplified by a factory or company organized by an
industrial union where job access is regulated by seniority and skills tend to be company-specific
(e.g., in an auto plant). Of the two, the private property model has the more extensively
developed internal labor market (ILM) and HRM system since the longevity of the employment
relationship makes all aspects of HRM more important to organizational performance.
Dunlop’s contribution to the ERS literature is the concept of an “industrial relations
system.” In his well-known book Industrial Relations Systems (1958), Dunlop defines an IR
system as “the complex of interrelations among managers, workers, and the agencies of
government” where “the parts and elements are interdependent and each may affect other
elements and outcomes of the system as a whole” (p. 13). He identified three main actors in an
ERS – employers and their representatives, employees and their representatives, and government
and its agencies; four main structural components – budget constraints, technology, power
relations and statuses of the actors, and labor-management ideology; and made the central
explanatory task of the model “why particular rules are established in particular industrialrelations systems and how and why they change” (p. ix). In practice, Dunlop gave most attention
to unions and collective bargaining as determinants of the rules of the ERS. Although the
influence of Dunlop’s book has faded in recent years, for several decades it was paradigmatic,
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per the observation of Cochrane (1979: 97), “The book continues to be the basis for a large
portion of industrial relations research around the world.”
EIR theorizing on employment systems next moves to the 1970s and 1980s and two more
contributions. The first is Doeringer and Piore (1971). Their contribution is to delineate four
factors that create ILMs: skill specificity, on-the-job training, unions, and customary law. Higher
levels of these four factors promote more internalization of labor coordination and, hence, a more
HRM intensive ERS. The second study is by Osterman (1987). He identifies four dominant ESs:
industrial, salaried, craft, and secondary. The nature of these different ESs is evident from their
names; what distinguishes Osterman’s paper is that he then links different ES models to different
configurations of four HRM practice areas – job classification, deployment (staffing), security,
and wage rules – and identifies five factors as the chief determinants of ERS selection – goals of
the firm (cost minimization, flexibility, predictability), production technology, social technology,
labor force characteristics, and government policies.
Our review of the EIR stream ends with recent contributions from the 1990s to date.
Three contributions merit brief mention (also see Applebaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg, 2000;
Orlitzky and Frenkel, 2005). First is Arthur (1992). His article is noteworthy because it integrates
the IR system idea; the role that strategy plays in shaping ERSs; and the “high performance”
model of work organization. He looks at steel minimills, differentiates between “cost
minimization” and “product differentiation” business strategies and then examines if they map
into a “command and control” or “high commitment” HRM/IR system. Cluster analysis reveals
the ERSs in the minimills sort into distinct types in line with the two strategies.
The second contribution is Marsden’s A Theory of Employment Systems (1999). The book
is almost entirely a work of theory and is based on ideas from institutional economics (IE, the
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“mother paradigm” of IR) and, in particular, works by Coase (1937), Simon (1951) and
Williamson (1975). Marsden identifies the constraints on behavior that are necessary for the
employment relationship to be a viable economic proposition for both employers and workers;
from these constraints he identifies four permutations of job design and skill development in
firms’ production systems, and in the last section of the book examines specific HRM practices
that go with each production system. His theory indicates ILMs and “transformed” HRM
systems develop when transaction costs are high and knowledge requirements are high and firmspecific -- conditions created in turn by factors such as interdependent job tasks, tacit knowledge,
learning on the job, and difficulty of monitoring job performance.
A third contribution is Kaufman’s (2004c; 2010) ERS model. It is similar to Marsden in
that it uses IE and, in particular, the transaction cost (TC) concept. He demonstrates that in a
world of very low TC organizations dis-agglomerate into small units and HRM systems are
“externalized” and “simple;” in a world of very high TC organizations agglomerate into very
large units and employment systems become “internalized” and “HRM intensive.” Variation of
five variables, in turn, causes different ERS permutations between these polar opposites: the
degree of bounded decision-making, interdependence in utility functions, interdependence in
production functions, indivisibilities and gaps in property rights, and legal restrictions on trade
by the sovereign.
Summary. EIR micro theories of employment systems suggest several things for macro
theory construction. First, these models suggest that factors external and internal to firms cause
employers to configure EIR practices in a relatively small number of discrete configurations.
Second, these models suggest that at the most fundamental level ERSs divide into two polar
opposites. On one end is a largely market-driven employment system where labor is treated as a
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commodity (a “hired hand”); the firm’s strategy focuses on cost minimization; EIR practices and
internal labor markets are sparse and porous; workers are likely to feel low commitment and
trust; and the employment relationship tends to be viewed by both sides as a zero-sum game. On
the other end of the spectrum is a human capital/commitment employment model where labor is
viewed as an asset (a “human resource”); the firm’s strategy seeks competitive advantage
through superior employee motivation, skills, and behaviors; considerable investment is made in
EIR practices, job security and internal labor markets; employees feel considerable loyalty and
dedication to the organization; and the employment relationship is viewed by both sides as a
positive-sum game. Third, these micro ERS theories suggest that a finer analysis reveals that
employment systems sort not just into two opposite ideal types but, rather, into a small number
of distinct but complementary systems. Although authors give different names to these
employment systems, in generic form they sort into models centered on, respectively, market
forces, the technology of production, organizational structure characteristics, occupational norms
and skills, and employee motivation and firm-specific skill development – in some cases
reinforced by the forces of trade unionism and labor law. Fourth, these theories also pinpoint
specific variables that influence firms’ choice of ERS systems: for example, the firm specific
nature of skills, the degree technology can control and monitor the quantity and quality of work,
the importance of human capital in production, firms’ positioning strategy for competitive
advantage, economic conditions in product and labor markets (e.g., degree of competition, extent
of surplus labor supply), and the relative importance for production of discretionary employee
work effort and citizenship behavior.
Macro Theories of EIR Systems
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We now come to EIR theories and models that explicitly address cross-national variation in
employment relations practices and outcomes. I winnow the literature and present a synopsis of
studies that represent significant contributions and explicit theoretical generalizations, presented
in chronological order of publication. Studies with more general but less testable classifications,
frameworks and implications (e.g., Dore, 1973; Adams, 1995; Locke, Kochan, and Piore, 1995;
Martin and Bamber, 2004) are perforce omitted due to space constraints, although they also offer
valuable insights. The same is true for comparative studies limited to specific EIR topic areas,
such as unions and collective bargaining (e.g., Hyman, 2001) and multinational corporations
(Briscoe, Schuler, and Claus, 2009). As before, the focus is on studies broadly in the institutional
and neo-institutional tradition.
The place to start has to be the book Industrialism and Industrial Man by Kerr, Dunlop,
Harbison and Myers (1960). This book is without doubt the most ambitious and large-scale study
ever done in CER; furthermore, the project secured large-sized funding from the Ford
Foundation and sponsored a wave of additional comparative EIR work by scholars from across
the world that over a two decade period produced more than forty additional books. The 1950s
and 1960s was a “golden age” for the pioneers of CER research; furthermore, the work of Kerr
et. al. and collaborators greatly helped spread the industrial relations field beyond its narrow
Anglo-American base. Representative titles produced include Human Resources for Egyptian
Enterprises (Harbison and Ibrahim, 1958), Industrial Relations in India (Myers and Kannappan,
1970), and Human Resources in Japanese Industrial Development (Levine and Kawada, 1980).
Other scholars from a variety of countries were also attracted into the CER field, such as Hugh
Clegg, Everett Kassalow, Frederick Meyers, James Morris, Ben Roberts, and Adolf Sturmthal.
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Kerr et. al. spent seven years visiting numerous countries around the world assembling
evidence for the book. Remarkably, while hailed as a great work at the time it has since largely
faded into anonymity or become a standard reference for critics of the “convergence thesis.”
Industrialism and Industrial Man takes Dunlop’s earlier IR systems model and extends it to a
cross-country comparison; further, while Dunlop’s IR systems model is largely static, Kerr et. al.
endeavor to put a dynamic element into it (via the industrialization process). Their thesis is that
CER exhibits both unity and diversity. The unity comes from the inexorable process of
industrialization – a process well advanced in some countries and only beginning in others –
which poses through technological and organizational constraints a significant degree of
conformity in broad EIR practices and outcomes (e.g., all industrialized countries have large
firms, bureaucratic employment systems, and labor movements). The diversity in EIR comes
from a variety of factors that are country or region specific: examples include the different
industrialization strategies of the ruling elites, diverse cultural and social conditions, and
different political and management-labor ideologies. Kerr et. al. predict a “first order” trend
toward convergence among nations in the “web of rules” that define national EIR systems as at
some point all countries are seen as getting on the industrialization bandwagon; nonetheless, they
also predict continued “second order” diversity in the EIR web of rules due to long-lasting crossnational differences in cultural, social and political factors.
Theorizing in CER entered a relatively inactive period during the 1970s and early 1980s.
The ice was broken, however, with publication of Industrial Relations: Origins and Patterns of
National Diversity by Michael Poole (1986). Similar to the “micro” EIR model of Barbash
(1984), Poole defines EIR broadly as “all aspects of the employment relationship” (p. 4) but then
designates employer-employee conflict as the central dependent variable of interest (p. 6). Poole
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also follows Dunlop (1958) in making employers, employees, and the state as the three principal
actors. He argues that divergent interests between employers and employees characterize the
employment relationship in both the spheres of production and distribution; hence, the task of
CER theory is to identify the variables that generate conflictive interests and the institutions and
practices designed by the three actors to ameliorate and resolve these conflicts. Poole allows that,
“at the current state of our knowledge, attempts to establish a general inclusive comparative
industrial relations theory are likely to prove fruitless” (p. 198). Nonetheless, he believes it is
possible to identify principal variables and causal pathways. In this spirit, Poole identifies the
state of economic development, the strategies of the actors, cultural values and ideologies, the
nation’s politico-economic structure, the power of the actors, and the institutional structure of
firms and EIR organizations as principal explanatory variables.
The third CER model examined here is by Colin Crouch in his book Industrial Relations
and European State Traditions (1993). It is an example of the genre of CER that focuses
primarily on the collective dimension of employment relations; in addition, it represents a
precursor to important ideas in the VoC literature surveyed in the next section.
As is true for many other authors, Crouch is critical of many specific aspects of Dunlop’s
IR systems model but, nonetheless, utilizes the basic systems idea. His focus in on European
countries and the central “dependent variable” is the degree of centralization and coordination of
industrial relations between organized capital (Capital) and organized labor (Labor). In this
respect, Crouch exemplifies a European tendency to define EIR narrowly as “collective
employment relations.” High coordination and centralization is representative of “neocorporatist” EIR systems, such as Germany and Scandinavia; low coordination and
decentralization is representative of “pluralist” or “conflictive” EIR systems, such as France and
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Britain. His thesis is that the pluralist/conflict EIR model is the zero-sum (or even negative sum)
“default” option, much as in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, while the cooperative neo-corporatist
model creates positive sum outcomes. Both systems exist in modern Europe; hence, the issue for
theory is to identify the variables that cause countries to gravitate toward one or the other.
Crouch argues that three factors are crucial. First, Labor must be powerful and be able to threaten
Capital with large losses, hence motivating Capital to seek accommodation and partnership.
Second, Capital and Labor must cover a significant part of the workforce and have centralized
organizational structures so they can incorporate diverse constituencies, demands and effects.
And, third, both Capital and Labor “peak organizations” must be able to police their members
and maintain intra-organizational unity. If these three factors are met, Capital and Labor develop
dense interactions and interdependencies, a culture of trust and cooperation, and a problemsolving communication approach that collectively allows them to move from the
conflictive/pluralist zero-sum outcome to the neo-corporatist/cooperative positive-sum outcome.
Next is the book Dynamic Human Resource Systems: Cross-National Comparisons by
James Begin (1997). Begin, a professor of industrial relations, describes his model as a blend of
ideas and concepts from the neo-institutionalist and strategic human resource management
literatures. Begin develops a CER theory and then applies it to an explanation of the EIR systems
in six nations: Germany, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. His
model is ambitious because he endeavors to not only explain differences in EIR architectures and
practices but also cross-national differences in four outcomes: degree of employee competence
and commitment; the degree of organizational flexibility; the degree of organizational
integration; and level of organizational performance. Unlike Crouch, Begin assumes EIR applies
to both union and nonunion employment relations.
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Begin follows Dunlop and theorizes CER in terms of discrete systems; further, he takes
the rules of the workplace as an intermediate variable in the causal chain that links external and
internal explanatory variables to differences in EIR architectures, practices and performance.
EIR systems are decomposed into six subsystems: work/job design, employee development,
staffing, workforce governance, rewards, and EIR management structure. According to Begin,
one driver of differences in EIR systems across nations is differences in competitive strategies on
the part of business firms. Given different resource endowments, levels of technology, and other
contextual factors, each nation comes to the global marketplace with different competitive
advantages. Government policies, national cultures, and business strategies adapt to align with
and exploit these competitive niches. Thus, the competitive advantage of the United States is
mass production of consumption goods, Germany’s is quality production of differentiated
durables and investment goods, and Japan’s is technological innovation and high quality
manufacturing. Differences in these production regimes lead to predictable differences in EIR
systems. Differences in production regimes then interact in a complementary way with other
external and internal factors to further differentiate EIR systems. One example in Begin’s model
is the external state-supported education system and the internal firm-created employee training
system. Japan’s and Germany’s strategy of quality production, for example, is partly conditioned
on a state school system that produces large numbers of graduates with top-end reading, math,
and science skills and well-developed in-firm training systems where workers get life-long
training and skill development in ILMs. The USA, by way of contrast, gravitates toward a mass
production EIR system in part because the education system also “mass produces” low-tomedium quality secondary-level graduates and firms rely less on in-firm training systems for
needed employee skills than hiring from external labor markets.
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A fifth study providing CER theory with INI roots is Converging Divergences by Harry
Katz and Owen Darbishire (2000). It raises an interesting empirical finding vis-à-vis the Crouch
study (just reviewed) and the VoC studies coming up. Crouch argues that a centralized neocorporatist EIR system maximizes national performance; perhaps ominously, Katz and
Darbishire observe that in seven major European, North American and Asian economies the late
20th century trend in EIR systems is the other way – that is, toward decentralization and
deunionization. This common trend in each country provides the “converging” theme for the
book. Within and across countries, however, they observe growing dispersion and variety in EIR
practices and outcomes and movement toward a larger number of discrete ESs in countries (e.g.,
Germany) where centralized bargaining institutions once covered most of the field. This
increased ES variation provides the “divergences” theme for the book.
Based on their seven country comparisons, Katz and Darbishire identify four discrete
employment systems that represent the major options in each nation. They label them: Low
Wage, HRM, Japanese-Oriented, and Joint-Team Based. The convergence trend toward
decentralization and deunionization, they argue, arises in broad outline from certain common
economic forces (globalization, deregulation) and organizational/technological factors (flatter
hierarchies, flexible manufacturing techniques). The rapidity and extent of decentralization and
deunionization across countries, however, is principally determined by the starting point of each
country in terms of the breadth and depth of institutional coordination and regulation of the EIR
system; that is, in more coordinated/regulated EIR systems the pace of decentralization and
deunionization is slower. In a complementary way, Katz and Darbishire also find that the growth
of within-country dispersion in EIR practices varies inversely with the pre-existing level of
institutional coordination and regulation.
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A sixth CER study of note is by Jill Rubery and Damian Grimshaw (2003). Reflecting
more a neo-Marxist and labour process (or “materialist”) orientation, they argue that central to
any theory of CER must be the nature of the production system in each country. Their work falls
in the INI tradition, however, because they do not posit a one-way causal arrow from the forces
of production to the relations of production, as in classic Marxist theory, but rather two-way
interactive arrows where the institutions of the economy also influence the production system.
Based on a number of features of production systems, they sort OECD countries into four types:
Japanese lean production, German diversified quality production, Italian flexible specialization,
and Swedish socio-technical. They then identify the major competitive strategy that accompanies
each and the derivative EIR system. For example, the Japanese system features high work
intensity, long-term employment security, and enterprise unions; the German system features a
highly skilled workforce, extensive training, and strong unions and industry-wide bargaining; the
Italian system features small workshops with skilled labour, informal training, and weak and
fragmented unions; and the Swedish system features extensive team working, social welfare
provisions, and nation-wide collaboration between employers associations and trade union
federations.
The final Anglo-American CER model considered here is by John Budd in his book
Employment with a Human Face (2004). Budd argues that every EIR system is built around
three fundamental structural constraints and desired behavioral outcomes: attainment of
efficiency, equity and voice. Attainment of these three outcomes leads to convergence among
national EIR systems along certain important dimensions. For example, efficiency dictates that
manufacturing firms in a given product line (e.g., autos) adopt EIR systems with certain common
job skills, training methods, and horizontal and vertical lines of job mobility; likewise,
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maintenance of internal and external equity dictates that these same firms link pay to individual
job performance and provide some formal method for dispute resolution. But diversity in EIR
systems is made possible because to some significant degree companies, industries and nations
put different weights on efficiency, equity and voice and choose different methods to achieve
them. This allows Budd to develop a “geometry” of CER (see his Figure 7.1) where national
EIRs sort into different efficiency, equity and voice combinations. A Social Partnership (neocorporatist) form of EIR system, for example, scores relatively high on formal employee voice,
low-to-medium on efficiency, and middle-high on equity; a Weak Voluntarist system, on the
other hand, adopts EIR architectures and practices that score high on promoting efficiency,
flexibility and low cost but score relatively low on both equity and voice.
European-Based INI Theories
A largely separate but complementary CER theoretical literature has developed with roots mostly
(but not exclusively) in continental Europe. As earlier noted, the field of industrial relations was
a relative late-comer to Europe (a term hereafter used to mean continental Europe) and never
established a significant institutional/organizational home-base in its universities. Further,
European sociology has taken within its borders many aspects of the employment relationship, a
fact that has also reduced the opportunities for EIR in Europe to development the same degree of
autonomy and presence as it has in Anglo-American countries.
Nonetheless, the same forces of globalization that over the last several decades have
stirred renewed interest in CER among Anglo-American scholars have also done so among their
European counterparts, leading to a parallel resurgence in scholarship in this area. Both
literatures have a substantial base in institutionalism but the European branch, being more
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influenced by sociology and political science than economics and human resource management - as well as distinctive European intellectual and ideological traditions, has developed a
distinctive theoretical discourse and set of ideas that distinguishes it from Anglo-American
theorizing in CER. The differences, however, are often more of emphasis and idiom; further,
several Anglo-American authors have made substantive contributions to developing this
European-based literature (e.g., Piore and Sabel, 1984; Hollingsworth in Hollingsworth and
Boyer, 1998) and in recent years a number of Anglo-American authors have further extended it,
particularly with respect to employment relations and CER (e.g., Godard, 2004; Wailes, Kitay
and Lansbury, 2008).
EIR-related research in Europe (hereafter “Euro-EIR”) spans disciplines but has its center
of gravity in economic sociology, albeit with significant cross-disciplinary contributions from
political science and other fields. While Anglo-American EIR traces its roots to founders such as
the Webbs, Commons and Perlman, economic sociology looks to people such as Durkheim,
Weber, Polanyi, and Marx for foundational ideas. Like neoclassical economists, for example,
Durkheim makes the division of labor a central organizing concept for sociology; the difference
is that he insists the division of labor is coordinated by more than competitive market forces –
e.g., power, authority, social norms, custom, and law – and functions within a network of
constraining and enabling formal and informal institutions. From this heritage grows two themes
that are at the center of institutionalism in modern economic sociology: the social embeddedness
of economic life and the coordination role played by institutions (Polanyi, 1944; Hall and
Soskice, 2001). Added to these are other concepts, probably the most important and oft-cited are
institutional complementarity and institutional comparative advantage.
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Euro-EIR parallels Dunlop in one important respect but then quickly diverges on another.
The common element is that both portray EIR practices and outcomes as an interconnected
system; the divergent element is that Dunlop argues the EIR system can be treated for purposes
of analysis as largely a separate self-contained subsystem of the national economy and society
while Euro-EIR argues (reflecting, in part, the stronger influence of Marxism) that the EIR
system cannot be divorced from or taken out of the larger economic and social system in which it
is embedded. This premise immediately leads to what is perhaps the most distinctive – certainly
the most cited – conceptual part of Euro-EIR: the notion that advanced industrial nations sort
into varieties of capitalism and, thus, by principles of complementarity and coherence into
varieties of EIR systems.
Many writers (e.g., Crouch, 2005) attribute the initial inspiration for the VoC idea to the
book Capitalism vs. Capitalism by Michel Albert (1993); by all accounts, however, its most
influential and oft-cited source is the edited volume Varieties of Capitalism by Hall and Soskice
(2001) and, in particular, the editor’s introductory chapter. Behind these scholarly works, it
should also be noted, are important real world events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
end of socialism as a seemingly viable economic alternative to capitalism. The sub-title of
Albert’s book gives a flavor of the argument; it also accurately indicates that the main line of this
literature is to some degree critical of an American-style neo-liberal market economy and
favorable toward a northern European-type “social market” economy. The subtitle reads: “How
America’s Obsession with Individual Achievement and Short-term Profit Has Led It to the Brink
of Collapse.” This subtitle also reveals, although less directly, another feature of the VoC
literature which bears on its utility as a basis for comparative work in EIR. That is, the concept
and focus of VoC potentially omits a large number of the world’s countries from analysis -- i.e.,
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all those lacking relatively modern and mature capitalist economies. Indeed, as a number of
commentators have noted, in VoC the attention tends to be on two countries as the archetypes –
Germany and the USA or, somewhat more broadly, Germany/Japan and the USA/UK (Streeck
and Yamamura, 2001). In recent years some authors have endeavored to broaden the reach of
VoC by distinguishing one or more other models, such as an Asian variety of capitalism (Yeung,
2000) and a Mediterranean variety of capitalism (Amable, 2003), although these remain
somewhat peripheral to the literature and still effectively leave out many other regions. I should
further note that the comparisons in VoC between Germany/Japan and the USA/UK are not
entirely novel as an earlier 1980s literature on corporatism focused on many of the same
differences in the respective economic systems (Goldthorpe, 1984).
Given these points of context, two different approaches – a deductive (theory-driven) and
an inductive (data driven) method -- have been taken to identify different models of capitalism. I
start with the deductive approach. It seeks to develop distinct models of capitalism based on a
focal theoretical concept; this concept is then used to deduce alternative ideal types (Deeg and
Jackson, 2007). Three major focal concepts have been used, respectfully: institutional means of
economic coordination; corporate governance systems; and national business systems. To a
significant degree, the models that emerge are overlapping, complementary, and nested one in
the other.
The first approach distinguishes VoC on the basis of differences in the mechanism that
coordinates market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). On one end of the spectrum is reliance
on relatively unfettered markets and competitive market forces of demand and supply; in effect,
coordination is performed by the “Invisible Hand” of the market. On the other end is reliance on
highly structured and regulated markets where market forces get a large degree of coordination
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and guidance from the “Visible Hand” of the state and lower-tier organizations, such as
employers’ associations and trade unions. The former is typically referred to as a liberal market
economy (LME) and the latter as a coordinated market economy (CME) (Streeck and
Yamamura, 2001). Corollary features of a LME are a more individualistic cultural ethos, lower
union density, a less interventionist government, and a smaller and more porous social safety net;
features of a CME are largely the opposite.
The second deductive approach distinguishes VoC based on different forms of corporate
governance (Dore, 2000; Gospel and Pendleton, 2005). On one end of the spectrum is the
shareholder model of capitalism; on the other is the stakeholder model. In shareholder countries
public policy treats corporations as the creatures and servants of their shareholder owners; that is,
corporations exist for only one purpose -- to serve the interests of the shareholders – and the
shareholders’ interests in turn are focused on maximizing the value of the stock shares.
Corporate governance, therefore, is structured so that the capital owners exercise dominant if not
sole authority in running the company, restrictions on capital investment decisions and
mergers/acquisitions are minimized, and financial markets are well developed, highly
competitive, and emphasize raising capital through stock and bond markets. Typically managers
operate with a shorter time horizon in shareholder countries.
In stakeholder countries, the situation is much the reverse. Corporations are created by
the state and while they must operate to earn profits for shareholders they must also serve
broader social objectives – with the idea that maximum profit may subtract from
accomplishment of certain social goals (e.g., a cleaner environment) and fail to achieve others (a
reduction in the length of the workweek). Hence, corporate governance is diffused among
different stakeholders so each has a say in the goals and operation of the company, such as
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intended with the German model of codetermination. In stakeholder countries, corporations are
more highly regulated, are embedded in a thicker institutional network of trade unions,
employers’ associations and government agencies, and obtain capital relatively more from banks
and governments. Hence, these companies have “patient capital” so executives can make
business decisions with a longer-term payback period; likewise, the limits on take-overs and
mergers and acquisitions to some degree insulates executives from short-term pressure to raise
the stock price and cut operating costs so they can better balance the interests and needs of not
only shareholders but also workers and communities.
The third deductive approach makes use of a concept called “national business systems”
and makes the focal theoretical construct alternative state strategies for growth and development
(Whitley, 1999; 2005). Of all institutions in an economy, the state is the most consequential
because it sets the constitutional rules that determine the legal framework of the economy and,
therefore, the shape of private organizations, the goals and constraints of individual agents, and
the nature of the coordination mechanisms used to bind together transactors. States choose
different growth and development strategies depending on various factors, including the
composition and objectives of the national elites, the nation’s culture and history, sources of
comparative advantage, and exposure to international trade. Based on these factors, Whitley
(2005) derives four state-created models of capitalism: Arm’s Length, Dominant Developmental,
Business Corporatist, and Inclusive Corporatist. In Arm’s Length countries (e.g., the USA), the
state’s growth strategy emphasizes competitive markets and modest-to-little government
intervention and encouragement of organized interest groups (e.g., unions, industry associations).
Nations using the Dominant Developmental strategy (e.g., South Korea) give the state a large
and active role in guiding the economy; further the state dominates or represses intermediary
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organized interest groups. A variant is the Business Corporatist model where the state (e.g.,
Japan) again plays a dominant role but gives more space to intermediary interest groups with
employer associations given high-level access to state policy-makers and labor groups tolerated
but given less access. The inclusive corporatist model (e.g., Sweden) is similar except that both
organized labor and business groups are given high level access and important coordinating
roles.
These deductive models of VoC have been criticized on various grounds (Crouch, 2005;
Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007; Kesting and Nielsen, 2008); for
example, for being overly static, deterministic, firm-centered and downplaying conflict and the
cross-country role of multinational corporations. Another criticism is that they impose arbitrary
and sometimes ill-fitting distinctions upon countries. An opposite approach, therefore, is
empirical and inductive where VoC categories are formed by using statistical techniques (e.g.,
cluster analysis) to sort countries into similar patterns. A good example is Amable (2003). He
examines twenty-one OECD economies. Based on a large number of statistical indicators, he
finds these countries sort into five relatively distinct models of capitalism. He calls these,
respectively, Market-based, Social Democratic, Asian, Mediterranean, and Continental
European.
Described to this point are various VoC models and associated theories. For them to be
relevant to CER, these models must be used to generate predictions about the architectures and
outcomes of EIR systems (Brewster, Wood, and Brookes, 2006). Here enters the core concept of
institutional complementarity. What all of these VoC models have in common is that they
generate differences in national business systems from non-labor attributes of societies – that is,
factors such as state development strategies and different forms of corporate governance. Thus,
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the challenge is to then derive the EIR system that matches the core VoC attribute. Toward this
end, INI writers go back to the “systems” idea and posit that the pieces of a national business
system are adjusted by economic agents until they (approximately) fit together and interact in a
(more or less) functionally coherent and perhaps synergistic manner. This notion of “pieces
fitting together” encapsulates the idea of complementarity; also found in the human resource
management literature in the form of the “configurational” hypothesis (Boxall and Purcell,
2008). More formally, INI state that two institutions are complementary when, “the presence (or
efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other” (Hall and Soskice,
2001: 17).
It is useful before going further to remind the reader that in most of the European-based
VoC literature (e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001) the term “industrial relations” is defined narrowly
to include only (or mostly) collective employment relations and, in particular, the institutions,
laws and practices pertaining to unions, employers associations and other aspects of collective
bargaining and voice. In what follows, however, I follow contemporary Anglo-American
convention and define IR broadly to include all types of employment relationships, all types of
employment practices (including HRM), and all types of social welfare regimes.
The most popular and oft-cited typology in VoC is between LMEs and CMEs (Hancké,
Rhodes, and Thatcher, 2007; Kesting and Nielsen, 2008). VoC writers hypothesize that each
form of capitalism should utilize a distinctly different EIR system (Hall and Soskice. 2001;
Godard, 2004; Wailes, Kitay, and Lansbury, 2008). LMEs, for example, favor competitive
market coordinating mechanisms, arms-length and non-interventionist governments, shareholder
governance systems, and low levels of organized interest group involvement. These
characteristics are hypothesized, via the principle of institutional complementarity, to lead to
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predictable patterns in the associated LME employment system. In particular, the EIR system in
an LME should feature more labor market volatility and employment in-flows and out-flows,
greater dispersion in employment outcomes (e.g., inter-industry wages, income inequality), more
porous and truncated ILMs, low levels of institutionalized employment security, greater labor
flexibility for firms, greater emphasis on competitive advantage through low cost production and
frame-breaking product innovation, more reliance on buying skills in the market rather than inhouse development, a relatively porous and thinly developed net of social insurance programs,
relatively weak protective labor laws, low union density, and decentralized collective bargaining.
As indicated previously, the archetype of a LME employment system is the USA – with
recognition that within the USA is a considerable degree of diversity in EIR systems that gets
glossed over at this high level of abstraction.
The features of the EIR system in a CME are much the opposite. Union density is
relatively high, collective bargaining is centralized and plays a large role in wage determination,
the state actively consults and coordinates with employers associations and union federations,
both labor markets and firms feature a substantial degree of stability and standardization in
wages and other economic terms of employment, ILMs are well developed and widespread and
employers spend considerable resources on skill development and training, state- and unionmandated employment protection is high, managements have much less flexibility in hiring, pay
and termination practices, workers enjoy a wide and generous social safety net of social
insurance programs, and workers are given voice through a variety of institutional channels
besides unions (e.g., works councils). Germany is the archetypical example of a CME.
VoC thus generates a fairly detailed set of hypotheses for CER analysis – at least for the
advanced industrial capitalist countries it largely applies to. It goes further, however, and also
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generates predictions about which type of economy and EIR system yield higher performance
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). LMEs and CMEs both have performance
advantages and disadvantages. The LME, for example, tends to favor radical innovation, gives
firms greater flexibility and lower cost, requires lower tax rates and less government bureaucracy
and regulation, and benefits from the spur of “do or die” competition. These factors promote
economic performance. Working against performance, however, are a mediocre educated and
trained workforce, an employee relations climate characterized by more adversarialism, distrust,
and free-riding, a short-term “stock market” approach to workforce investment and management,
socially corrosive levels of inequality and insecurity, and more boom and bust.
The CME also has performance advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, for
example, are hypothesized factors such as a higher educated and skilled workforce, an
employment relationship with greater trust, cooperation and commitment, more stable and noninflationary wage settlements, continuous if incremental innovation and quality improvement,
and greater equality and social solidarity. On the downside, the EIR system in a CME is
relatively rigid and inflexible, entails higher costs on firms, can make it difficult to terminate
employees for poor performance or in economic downturns, and can discourage new business
formation and in-country capital investment.
Is there a clear prediction about which variety of capitalism is preferable? Most VoC
writers tend to favor the CME model (Streeck , 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001). On economic
grounds, they believe in the long-run a CME outperforms a LME because the former emphasizes
a “high road” strategy of growth and development based on skills, cooperation and trust while
the LME emphasizes a “low road” strategy of cost cutting, Taylorist work practices (deskilling,
narrow training), and an adversarial/low trust climate. In effect, VoC theorists look at the
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employment relationship as a form of Prisoner’s Dilemma game and predict that LME’s
gravitate toward the low performance “lose-lose” option while CME’s are able to move to the
high performance “win-win outcome because their EIR systems generate better communication,
trust and cooperation among the social partners. Further, they argue that different national
business systems develop an institutional comparative advantage and path dependent trajectory
and moving from one system to another (e.g., from a CME to LME) can therefore lead to very
suboptimal performance (Deeg and Jackson, 2007).
Since this chapter is focused on theory I will not review the extensive empirical literature
and accompanying debates on these issues. Suffice it to say, however, the evidence is quite
mixed. If attention is focused only on rates of GDP and employment growth, the LMEs appear to
win. If a broader set of objectives are considered, including social outcomes such as employment
security and income equality, then performance shifts toward CMEs. What this perhaps indicates
is again the importance of institutions. Certain countries, such as in the Anglo-American sphere,
for historical and cultural reasons favor a more market oriented and individualized EIR system
and use political institutions to create rules of the game that favor this type of system and the
high GDP growth/high inequality outcomes it produces; other countries, such as in continental
Europe, favor a more regulated and collective form of capitalism and use political institutions
that set rules of the game that trade-off lower DGP growth for greater security for workers and
equality for all parts of society.
Conclusion
Comparative employment relations has been an active area of research for more than a half
century. Whether nations are converging to a common EIR system remains a hotly debated
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question. What can safely be said, however, is that some convergence has taken place in
theorizing about the origins of cross-national differences in EIR systems. Nearly all participants
agree that an explanation of cross-national variation in EIR institutional architectures is crucial to
a viable CER theory. There is also a wide degree of consensus on the types of variables that are
important to explaining this diversity in EIR institutions. Following Marxist models, attention
must be focused on the nature of national production systems; following neoclassical models
attention must also be focused on characteristics of national market systems and the stage of
economic development; following human resource management attention must also be given to
national differences in EIR strategies among the actors; and following sociology and
anthropology attention must be given to cross-national cultural/social traditions and values. EIR
also brings its own unique perspective and contribution to CER theorizing, however. It does so
partly by melding and synthesizing these other perspectives into an integrated model; it also does
so through its own unique concepts and ideas. Central to CER, for example, is the concept of an
employment relations system, different models and typologies of ERSs, identification of key
variables and constraints that form ERSs, and the role of institutional complementarities. All of
this represents a promising beginning; much more, however, awaits to be done -- particularly
with respect to greater analytical development.
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